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One day in a faculty meeting I shocked my colleagues in American Studies by saying 
that I wasn’t sure we taught our majors anything, that since I define American Studies as 
a cognitive style, as a distinctive way of thinking about things, as a style that looks for 
connections rather than distinctions, I suspected that our successful majors already had 
learned that style in early childhood and really all we were doing in our American Studies 
classes was weeding out or driving away those who did not already have that cognitive 
style. Some students who tried our courses immediately recognized in their teachers a 
familiar interdisciplinary cognitive style—their own. Other students didn’t “get it” and 
found the American Studies way of thinking to be puzzling and, frankly, hard to outline 
in one’s notes. So, I mused, we really aren’t teaching our majors anything; we’re just 
giving them a friendly, safe, rewarding space to exercise their inclinations, to think 
outside the university’s usual categories. My colleagues, somewhat accustomed to my 
crazy talk, moved on without comment, maybe preferring not to think about this claim.  
                                                
1 My thinking through and writing this essay has been assisted immeasurably by 
conversations with Jon Wagner, who should not be held responsible for everything 
here—just some. And many conversations with Ami Sommariva, the UC Davis Cultural 
Studies graduate student and Chancellor’s Teaching Fellow who team-taught the folklore 
course with me, sparked the argument here.  
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Then, a few years later, a graduate student who had won a Chancellor’s Teaching 
Fellowship to redesign and team-teach with me my folklore course (“American Folklore 
and Folklife”) and I were having lunch and puzzling over the fact that so many students 
in our class of forty had stumbled in writing a short interpretive essay on a folklore 
tradition and performance from their childhood. We had guided them through reading 
Cindy Dell Clark’s Flights of Fancy, Leaps of Faith: Children’s Myths in Contemporary 
America (1998) and had worked through a few examples of folklore from our childhoods, 
examples that showed how a story or proverb or custom in a family worked to address 
social and psychological anxieties that arise in childhood and in family dynamics. We 
warned them that we wanted them to do more than “explain” the folk tradition and 
performance they were writing about; we wanted them to “Interpret” the text in all its 
contexts and to show us how family members used folklore as a resource for managing 
social relationships in a high context folk group.   
Some students wrote great papers, most wrote borderline papers, and several failed 
miserably, unable even to identify a folklore tradition and performance let alone interpret 
its meanings in contexts. “Maybe you can’t teach folklore,” I said to my graduate student 
colleague. Unlike my professor colleagues, she smiled in recognition. We had engaged in 
several months’ worth of designing the course and thinking through the teaching, and we 
anticipated some of the students’ difficulties in stepping back from the “natural attitude” 
(as Alfred Schutz [1980] called it) and seeing the operation of folklore in their everyday 
lives. But now we were faced with the first set of papers and many students still didn’t 
“get it.” 
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Of course, we had set ourselves up for this failure, but we had done it knowingly and 
willingly. We had announced at the outset of the course and in every session that the 
overarching goal of the course was to teach them how to “think like a folklorist.” Here is 
the specific set of course goals we laid out in the syllabus: 
In summary, you will read, do fieldwork, and write throughout the quarter, 
learning 
1. some general, enduring themes in American culture, as evidenced in folk 
culture; 
2. techniques for interpreting the meanings and social functions of multiple 
forms of contextually-situated American folklore and folklife; 
3. the relationships between folk culture and other cultural systems, such as 
popular, official, and elite culture; 
4. the dynamics of gender, race, class, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, and other 
human particularities in folk groups; 
5. the methodological and ethical issues involved with doing fieldwork with 
living informants;  and 
6. the relevance of the study of folklore to the student's life, including the 
student's academic major. 
 
Compare this list with another possible set of goals for a course in “American Folklore 
and Folklife”:  
In this course our goals are for the student to be able to (1) define folklore, (2) 
distinguish between oral, customary, and material folk traditions, (3) identify and 
give examples of several folklore genres, (4) name and describe five major 
theories in folklore, and (5) define a set of keywords from the readings and 
lectures. 
 
Note that the second set of course goals actually could be measured with so-called 
“objective tests,” such as multiple choice, matching, and short answer. We could teach 
that course to twenty or to two hundred; the pedagogy would differ little, though the 
learning might be shallow and short-lived.  The first set of goals, the ones we actually 
used in the course, require the students to use direct observation or memory to describe 
and interpret performances of folk traditions in context. The students write longer pieces 
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and someone needs to read the essays. The overarching goal, as we said many times 
throughout the term, was for our students to “learn to think like folklorists.”  But what did 
we mean by that phrase? 
Thinking Like a Folklorist 
I regret that my graduate student colleague and I never laid out for the students 
something like the list I am offering here, though (as you will see), each item on the list is 
possibly as maddeningly vague as the general phrase, “think like a folklorist.” Remember 
that the title of this essay is “You Can’t Teach Folklore.” Of course I don’t want to 
believe that, so here is a tentative list of how you know you are thinking like a folklorist: 
• you believe that our everyday (both ordinary and extraordinary) reality is socially, 
rhetorically constructed, and that to a large extent our thoughts and actions are 
overdetermined by the objective structures that externalize subjective realities and 
provide the structures for our own internalization of that constructed reality (I am 
using the language here from Berger and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of 
Reality [1966]);  
• you often experience a sort of “double consciousness” about your everyday life; that 
is, most times you experience your everyday life in what the phenomenologists 
call the taken-for-grated, “natural attitude,” but at other times you are aware that 
you or others around you are using (performing) folk traditions, from genres of 
everyday speech (stories, jokes, charms, proverbs, etc.) to more complex play and 
rituals (e.g., a family meal); 
• in those moments of recognition, you ask yourself and possibly answer the 
quintessential folklorist’s question, a variant of Kenneth Burke’s (1973: 106) 
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pentad of “act, scene, agent, agency, purpose”; the folklorist’s version is “Who 
performed what traditional item of folklore (and how), where, for whom, and 
why? What was the result?” 
• when you watch a television show or film or view advertising the double 
consciousness often clicks on as you recognize a folk idea, motif, or folk-based 
formula narrative in the popular culture text; you can’t play a video game without 
sometimes recognizing the folk narrative roots of the game (and even if you don’t 
know the folk narrative, you recognize that this electronic genre is tapping your 
familiarity with folk narrative formulae);  
• when you read a newspaper or magazine or online narrative (blogs, discussion 
groups, etc.) you sometimes recognize the ways people writing in these genres use 
folk ideas and folk narrative formulae; 
• when you watch a speech on television or hear one in person you recognize the 
formulaic oral structures and style of the speech (e.g., African American 
preaching style in Obama’s best speeches);  
This is a list of how you know you are thinking like a folklorist, and the process may be 
gradual, though I think there is an “aha” experience where suddenly (like Bateson’s 
[1972a] porpoise, see below) the world changes because you now have the double 
consciousness I describe above. I think this moment resembles religious conversion, and 
if I’m right, then that has consequences for answering the question, “Can you teach 
folklore?”  
Let’s say that a student believes she is thinking like a folklorist. How does she 
demonstrate that to the teacher? Let me put this question off for a while and explore my 
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claim that you actually can’t teach someone else how to think like a folklorist, that they 
have to get there themselves. Somehow.  
Cognitive Styles and Logical Types 
Some students don’t get it. I’m not blaming them, thereby excusing my culpability in 
their failure to demonstrate the ability to think like an American Studies person or to 
think like a folklorist. I believe that differences in cognitive style are real and relevant to 
the discipline one chooses for a college major and to the ability to acquire and reproduce 
the ways people in a discipline or specialty think about things. I believe the ability to 
think like a folklorist is connected to a cognitive style and that the cognitive style is 
learned early in life. Maybe college students are too old to change cognitive style or, at 
least, to create some new ones alongside the old. If I think it’s too late, then my strong 
claim to my American Studies colleagues is true. If I think it’s not too late, that maybe in 
some cases adults can acquire some new ways of thinking, then maybe that has some 
consequences for the pedagogy of teaching folklore. Maybe folklore can be taught, after 
all. 
Let me explore this dilemma by recounting a teaching failure I experienced several 
times. I should say as preface that my thinking about learning is heavily influenced by the 
work of Gregory Bateson and, in particular, by his use of Russell’s Theory of Logical 
Types (Mechling 1983). That theory—too grossly summarized by saying that “no class 
can be a member of itself” (Bateson 1972b: 280)—provides Bateson with the 
fundamental ideas lying behind his frame theory of play and fantasy (Bateson 1972c) and 
the Double Bind Theory of Schizophrenia he worked out with colleagues (Bateson et al. 
1956). Bateson’s point is that we violate this rule of logic every day in our normal 
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communication, that the violation creates a logical paradox, and that well -functioning 
(healthy) humans learn how to handle such paradoxes. In fact, says Bateson, play, 
fantasy, and ritual are common, healthy ways people cope with the paradoxical 
communication. Some people for some reasons cannot deal with the paradox and may 
even be driven mad. Madness and creativity are the polar ends of responses, and that’s 
what links Bateson’s theory of play and fantasy to his work on schizophrenia. 
Understanding the play frame is crucial to my argument. Briefly, two or more 
mammals can play because they exchange signals that establish a frame for their 
subsequent communication, a frame that bears the metamessage (a message about 
messages) “this is play,” so the players understand that the messages exchanged within 
the play frame do not mean what they would mean outside that frame. The mood of play 
is subjunctive—“What if?” A cognitively healthy person can play, can understand and 
move between levels of logical type, from messages to metamessages, back to messages. 
Bateson would blame most cases of a person’s inability to make these distinctions on 
early childhood socialization.2  
When Bateson applied the Theory of Logical Types to learning, he saw that mammals 
can learn to learn, something he called “deutero-learning.” My favorite example is the 
performing porpoise he writes about, a porpoise that had a burst of creativity once she 
realized that she was being rewarded not for specific behaviors but for demonstrating 
                                                
2 Bateson seems to blame mothers for the double-bind communication, but really his 
point is that people with more power in a communication event can put those with less 
power into the double bind, especially if the person with less power has no easy way to 
escape the communication and power relationship. In early socialization in the U.S. the 
mother is most often in this power position, but it could be a father, as well.  
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new behaviors, for novelty (Bateson 1972a). The porpoise, in effect, came to understand 
the difference between specific responses to stimulus and the higher class of newness. 
I am summarizing too simply here some dauntingly complex ideas, but I think I can 
bring the Bateson point back to teaching folklore by (as I said above) reporting a 
particular failure of teaching. 
One of the courses I taught often was entitled “The Lives of American Children,” a 
multi-disciplinary look at the study of the cultures of American children. A book I liked 
using was Joel Best’s Threatened Children: Rhetoric and Concern About Child Victims 
(1993). Best is a sociologist, but he also acts like a rhetorical critic in this fine book as he 
explores the socially-constructed, rhetorically-constructed “social problem” of the 
abduction of children by strangers. I don’t recall using the book in my folklore class, but I 
might have, as Best’s book really has lots to do with rumor and legend, from razor blades 
in apples at Halloween to the McMartin Preschool abuse case. His basic question is this: 
why is there so much cultural attention to stranger abductions when, in fact, these are 
very rare and there are far more dangerous situations faced by children? He uses Stephen 
Toulmin’s model of argument to analyze the cultural warrants that persuade an audience, 
leading them from “facts” to claims.  
In the “Children’s Lives” class we read and analyzed the Best book carefully, with 
special attention to the Toulmin model of persuasion and how our American Studies 
interpretive work would be around the cultural warrants. We infer from the rhetoric of the 
arguments what the rhetor (the person making the claim) thinks are the beliefs held by the 
audience such that the beliefs provide warrants (permission) to follow and accept the 
rhetor’s move from “facts” to “claims.” The skilled rhetor moves the audience from their 
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existing folk beliefs to the new beliefs (and possible action) the rhetor wants them to 
hold.  
The assignment in my “Childen’s Lives” class was to identify another “claim” about 
threats to children—television, music, video games, internet porn, internet predation, and 
so on—and to analyze the claim. After teaching the book a few times, I learned to be as 
explicit as possible in this warning: do not become a claims-maker yourself; your job is 
to analyze the claims made by others.  
My experience was that about a quarter of the students were incapable of 
distinguishing between making a claim and analyzing a claim, no matter how many times 
we went over it in class and in my office hours. My wife, a rhetorical critic, taught the 
book a few times and had the same experience. A UC Davis colleague, a sociologist, 
taught my “Children’s Lives” course once, used the Best book, and had the same 
experience. Our inclination as teachers is to believe that all the students will get this 
distinction is we only can figure out how to say it again more clearly. 
I came to doubt that faith. Thinking this through using Bateson led me to believe that 
some students really do have a cognitive deficit on the matter of distinguishing levels of 
logical types.3  Put differently, nothing I was doing in class actually taught (or could 
                                                
3 I’m going to stick by the phrase “cognitive deficit” because that’s the way Bateson 
would put it, I think, but readers of an earlier draft of this essay worried that the phrase 
implied something more pejorative than Bateson or I intend. The “cognitive deficit” has 
nothing to do with gender, social class, or ethnicity, but the phrase does capture the 
judgment that the ability to move up and down the levels of Logical Typing is a good 
ability for a human to acquire. I believe that people who acquire that cognitive skill are 
healthier and happier than those who fail somehow to make that acquisition. Moreover, 
since that skill is fundamental to the ability to do “reflexive ethnography,” and since the 
ability to step outside one’s taken-for-granted, everyday reality is a profoundly political 
skill, I believe that my health and happiness are best served by being surrounded by as 
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teach) the students how to distinguish between making a claim and analyzing a claim. 
Those who could see this distinction came to the book and to my course with the 
cognitive ability learned much earlier in life. I don’t believe I taught that ability to them.  
I gave up on the students who could not get it, gave them bad grades (was that fair?), 
and moved on. I felt neither qualified nor equipped to provide them with the 
compensatory learning necessary to move easily between levels of logical type. I wasn’t 
their therapist. 
Feeling now that I had been unfair to those students makes me wonder whether there 
are some pedagogical strategies that actually can do some of the needed compensatory 
education. Reading about the research in neuroplasticity—the ability, for example, of the 
brain to change itself—began to persuade me that cognitive styles are not necessarily 
established and then fixed in early childhood; the brain and its cognitive styles are more 
plastic than we thought (Doidge 2007).  
The key is play. If a person can play, then she understand the paradoxes of Logical 
Types and, more important, she understands the value of play (and then ritual) as defense 
against the paradoxes encountered in play and in everyday life. Creativity wards off 
insanity.  Understanding the difference between literal and figurative communication 
empowers the individual and gives her tools for taking power in situations where she is 
relatively powerless.  
But can a person with the cognitive deficits I’ve been describing learn to play at an 
older age, say the eighteen years of the usual first-year college student in a folklore class? 
Or are we talking about play therapy that takes a long time? 
                                                                                                                                            
many reflexive people as possible. Put differently, people unaware of the social 
construction of their reality and of their truths are a danger to me.  
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An Autobiographical Excursus 
Discussing some of these things over our monthly breakfast, my sociologist friend 
asked me where I thought I had acquired the ability to move between levels of logical 
types, where I had acquired the reflexive  “double consciousness” such that I could step 
aside from the taken-for-granted, natural attitude toward everyday reality. I am pretty 
sure that one source was watching my parents’ public performance in the roles of 
bartender and other hotel and restaurant service roles (I grew up in Miami Beach) and 
their private performances at home. I lived Goffman’s (1959) distinction between front 
stage and back stage, so the notion that everyday social life is a theatrical performance 
makes great sense to me. As a teenager in high school I enjoyed competitive debate, 
where I debated the affirmative side of a policy proposition one round and the negative 
side the next round. As a college student, I acted in theatrical productions. The debate and 
acting reinforced the basic lesson I had acquired by age five—namely, that one could 
perform a social role without considering that role to be the “real,” authentic self. Berger 
and Luckmann (1966:172) call this “cool alternation,” the ability to play roles with the 
full realization that they are a fiction (that is, as the Latin root says, made up).   
I would give equal credit to my parents’ having very good senses of humor. The 
cognitive ability to play—and humor is a prime example of play—is crucial to the 
cognitive abilities I am trying to define in this essay. As Arthur Koestler says in The Act 
of Creation (1964), humor, science, and art all rely upon the ability to see intersecting 
changes of frame, which is another way of recognizing the ability to move deftly up and 
down levels of Logical Type. 
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I should note here that there is a delicate balance between creativity and madness as 
people scramble for ways to deal (for example) with the double bind. Many of Bateson’s 
ideas about Logical Types and Double Bind communication came from the work he and 
colleagues were doing on schizophrenia (Bateson et al., 1956). Some children find 
creative ways to escape or otherwise deal with double bind communications. Others slip 
into pathological communication patterns.  
Bateson noticed as he watched the training sessions with the porpoise that suddenly 
burst into creativity that the trainer was worried that he was driving the porpoise insane 
with the constant changes in what he was rewarding (Bateson 1972a). The trainer wanted 
to break off the experiment, but then the porpoise had the burst of creativity, which 
Bateson attributed to the porpoise’s figuring out that what was being rewarded was 
novelty, not a specific behavior. Madness and creativity. I arrived at the same conclusion 
some years ago when I wrote an essay applying Bateson’s ideas to Joseph Heller’s 
famous novel, Catch-22. The military provides the archetypal conditions for the double 
bind, and in Heller’s novel we see the complete range of “solutions” employed by the 
characters, from full madness to literal escape (Mechling 1988). I surmise that my 
students who didn’t “get it,” who were not adept at moving easily between frames, up 
and down the ladder of Logical Types, that those students had some sort of early 
socialization that tended them toward literal rather than figurative understanding and 
thinking. A good deal of the humor in Catch-22 comes from a character’s treating 
figurative language as literal (and sometimes literal as figurative).  
I am sure that there other early childhood experiences that conditioned my double 
consciousness (eg.,the marginality of being raised a Protestant in a predominantly Jewish 
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community, which itself was a minority in the nation, making me simultaneously a 
member of a religious minority and a religious majority). And each person (my wife, my 
sociologist friend) who works easily with frames and the paradoxes of Logical Types 
doubtless followed a unique path of experiences to arrive at this shared cognitive ability. 
But I am convinced that these are childhood experiences, still leaving open the question 
whether college-age adults can ever acquire the ability after childhood. 
I should add here that I am skeptical of the developmental stage theories and 
frameworks created by William G. Perry (1970) and others as they attempt to explain 
differences in cognitive processes in college students. My skepticism arises out of my 
high school debate experiences, namely, that fifteen-year-olds can hold and act on 
epistemological relativism, a skill which (by most developmental schemes) is acquired 
years later in college. Moreover, my guess is that those who liked debate and did well in 
the competition learned that relativism and practiced “the performance of truth or belief” 
(let’s call it) much earlier in life. In tune with my title, you probably can’t teach a young 
person how to debate. The debaters choose themselves for the activity. 
Which brings me back to the first, pedagogical question. Can those college students 
who don’t “get it” acquire the cognitive ability in a folklore course? Developmental 
theories of college-age student epistemologies suggest that the pedagogy can help 
students move from dualism to multiplicity to full relativity with commitment (Perry 
1970).  The hunch I have been pursuing in this essay is that Bateson’s understanding of 
learning using Russell’s Theory of Logical Types better describes the leaps people make 
when, for example, they learn to learn. The next step is to inquire if Bateson’s alternative 
model has any practical application in the folklore classroom. 
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 A Pedagogy for Stepping Outside the Natural Attitude 
How does one step outside of his or her taken-for-granted knowledge? Berger and 
Luckmann tackle this question near the end of their classic work, The Social Construction 
of Reality (1966). If, as the sociologists of knowledge claim, all of our knowledge is 
constructed through our interactions with other people and we have no other access to 
“reality,” then how do we live and act in an everyday world knowing that our knowledge 
is so over-determined? Where is the space to step to in order to look back at our 
everyday, socially constructed reality when all spaces are socially determined?  
William James and Peter L. Berger would say that the first step is an act of will, the 
moral will to believe. But there are a few more solutions. What we should be looking for 
are strategies or acts that will break the natural attitude and make space for reflexive 
understanding, and we should figure out what these strategies mean for our folklore 
pedagogy.  
Some declarations first. I believe that the most productive way to think about teaching 
and learning is to embrace the midwife model rather than the banking model (a 
distinction first made by Freire [1970]). That is, rather than conceive as our teaching goal 
the “deposit” of knowledge into the minds of students for later “withdrawal,” in the 
midwife model it’s the students who do the creative work; we teachers are there to create 
the conditions for creativity and to cheer it on. It follows, then, that teachers should avoid 
“the coverage fallacy,” the notion that there is a body of knowledge to be covered in a 
course. If one’s goal in teaching a folklore course is to get the students to think like 
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folklorists, then the emphasis and, ultimately, the assessment have to be on process rather 
than product.  
The midwife model of the teaching-learning event also suggests that learning is 
collaborative, a social event involving group process. Bateson would say that it makes no 
sense to talk about a single organism’s (student’s) “learning,” that what really learns is 
the whole system, the student plus context. Learning is change and change relies upon the 
communication of information, which Bateson defines as “news of a difference.”  
With that preface, let me sketch as best I can Bateson’s ideas about learning and 
speculate on what these ideas mean for the folklore classroom in which the goal is for 
students to learn how “to think like a folklorist.” I say “speculate” because Bateson was 
interested in the theory and only a little in the pedagogical implications of the theory. 
That’s for us to piece together. Bateson actually understood decades before the 
neuroscience discoveries chronicled by Doidge (2007) the ways the mind changes. And 
just as Doidge has great respect for Freud’s initial insights a century ago, so Bateson 
returns often to Freud. So I want to bring together these connected ideas and speculate on 
what they imply for folklore pedagogy. 
Bateson addresses learning in many of his essays and books, but a good place to look 
is the piece, “The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication,” which he wrote 
in 1964, read at a conference in 1968, and finally published in 1972 (Bateson 1972b). It is 
important to realize at the outset that for Bateson any system is capable of “learning.” 
Organisms can learn, of course, but so can ecosystems and other cybernetic systems 
where the system changes with feedback. Cybernetic machines, ecosystems, non-human 
animals, human animals—all learn and change. As always, Bateson begins with the 
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Theory of Logical Types, which (as we have seen) holds that “no class can in formal 
logical or mathematical discourse, be a member of itself; that a class of classes cannot be 
one of the classes which are its members” (1972b: 280). What provided Bateson with the 
insights of his frame theory of play and fantasy and the double-bind theory of 
schizophrenia is that everyday communication constantly breaches these rules of logic, 
thereby creating paradoxes that can change the organism (toward creativity or toward 
madness, as we have seen).  
Bateson distinguishes between levels of learning based upon the “types of error which 
are to be corrected in the various learning processes” (1972c:287). The student (I’m 
going to use this word from now on instead of the word “organism” or “machine,” which 
Bateson would include in his discussion) is in a steady state of “zero learning” when 
there are no changes in response to stimuli, when the student can respond correctly to 
every question or situation. “Learning I” describes for Bateson what we normally think of 
as behavioral learning, habituation, when the links between stimuli and responses are 
strengthened or extinguished through reinforcement. This sort of learning, Bateson 
emphasizes, relies upon repeatable contexts, which means that this level of learning is 
subject to the laws of the Theory of Logical Types. It is worth quoting Bateson at length 
on this point (1972b:289): 
Either we must discard the notion  of “context,” or we retain this notion and, with it, 
accept the hierarchic series—stimulus, context of stimulus, context of context of 
stimulus, etc. This series can be spelled out in the form of a hierarchy of logical types 
as follows: 
Stimulus is an elementary signal, internal or external. 
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Context of stimulus is a metamessage which classifies the elementary signal. 
Context of context of stimulus is a meta-metamessage which classifies the 
metamessage. 
And so on.  
Consider play. When organisms communicate to each other and agree to a play frame, the 
metamessage “this is play” is of a higher logical type (in the hierarchy) than are the 
messages exchanged within the play frame. The metamessage “this is play,” though, is 
only one example of a class of similar metamessages, which include “this is ritual,” “this 
is a medical encounter” (see Emerson 1970), and so on.  
What Bateson calls “Learning II” (also called “deutero-learning” or “learning to 
learn”) is a “change in the process of Learning I, e.g. a corrective change in the set of 
alternatives from which choice is made” (Bateson 1972c: 293). Recall Bateson’s 
porpoise, which had to figure out that what was being rewarded was not specific behavior 
(Learning I) but novelty (Learning II). (Bateson also discusses Learning III and Learning 
IV, but they are not relevant to this discussion.)  
Bateson notes that Learning II is of interest to anthropologists, psychologists, 
psychiatrists, educators, and others in the human sciences because understanding 
phenomena like “character” or personality requires an understanding that human behavior 
is highly contextual and changeable. Learning II has to do with the ways a person 
“punctuates” interactions. In discussing the psychotherapeutic phenomenon of 
“transference,” Bateson makes a claim that brings me full circle—namely, that Learning 
II “(a) dates from early infancy, and (b) is unconscious” (1972c:300). He adds that since 
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Learning II is a way of “punctuating” events and that a way of punctuating events is not 
true or false but simply a way of looking at events, Learning II is “almost ineradicable.”  
So following Bateson we find ourselves back at my initial hunch. The ability to 
“think like a folklorist” is an example of the ability to move up and down the hierarchy of 
logical types—messages, metamessages, metametamessages-- and to understand at what 
level one is working. If Bateson is right, this ability is acquired in early childhood, is 
largely unconscious, and is ineradicable because it never can be falsified in the real 
world. Nothing we do in the classroom affects this ability. 
That would be the end of the inquiry were it not for some hope held out by the recent 
discoveries that the brain can change itself in response to experiences (Doidge 2007). 
Grounded as he was in biology and evolutionary theory (his father was the famous 
English biologist, William Bateson), Gregory Bateson anticipated these discoveries, so 
perhaps there is hope for the folklore classroom if we can figure out whether Learning II 
can be acquired later than childhood and can be brought to the conscious (the 
ineradicability is an advantage, not a hinderance).   
For both Bateson and the neuroscientists studying the plastic brain, the 
psychoanalytic session is a context where unconscious materials are brought to the 
conscious level and where the patient might change interactions and their punctuation, 
possibly moving from unconscious Learning I to conscious Learning II. Earlier in this 
essay, when I was describing my teaching failure around the Joel Best book, I said that I 
was not my students’ therapist so could not help them make the breakthrough necessary 
to see the distinction between being a claimsmaker and analyzing claims-making. But 
maybe I was wrong, maybe I can be their therapist, but in a limited and special way. 
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Therapy can be dangerous, but so can good teaching. I am not saying that teachers 
untrained in psychotherapy should become the therapists of individual students. But what 
we call the Socratic method of teaching is not far from “the talking cure” originated by 
Freud. So what if we imagined what the folklore classroom would look and sound like if 
we were to conceive of the activities as something like group therapy?  
 
The Folklore Classroom as Group Therapy 
Reflexive culture studies resembles individual or group therapy, where the goal is 
self-understanding. My earliest experience with this notion came in 1971 when I began 
my first (and, it turns out, only) academic job in the American Studies Program at the 
University of California, Davis. Robert Merideth, the new chair of the program, had just 
recently come from Miami University (Ohio), where he and several other faculty 
members had been forced to move on for their politically radical activities, which 
included trying to establish a local chapter of The New University Committee, a group of 
academics and intellectuals against the Vietnam War and for social and economic justice. 
Merideth had written about reflexive American Studies as cultural therapy, and UC Davis 
provided a new space for him to elaborate that idea. Merideth, like many academics, was 
attracted to the writings of Herbert Marcuse and others in the Frankfurt School tradition 
who were attempting to synthesize the ideas of Marx and Freud, and by the 1970s 
Merideth saw Gestalt Psychology—initially through the culture critical writing of Paul 
Goodman-- as the therapeutic theory and practice best suited to doing reflexive American 
Studies. 
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Merideth was not the only academic pursuing these ideas. Louise and George 
Spindler wrote and spoke for many years about the ways reflexive anthropology could be 
the basis for what they called “cultural therapy.” By this phrase they meant “a process of 
bringing one’s own culture in its manifold forms to a level of awareness that permits one 
to perceive it as a potential bias in social interaction and in the acquisition or transmission 
of skills and knowledge. One’s culture becomes a third presence somewhat removed 
from the person, so that one’s actions can be taken as caused by one’s culture and not by 
one’s personality” (Spindler 1999:466). They are describing the double consciousness I 
discussed above when I tried to operationalize what I meant by “thinking like a 
folklorist,” and I share the Spindler’s explicit claim that the goal of achieving this 
consciousness, as in all therapy, is some sort of liberation, some increase in the degrees of 
freedom one has over the choices one makes in life.  
Moreover, though the Spindlers do not see this consciousness through a Batesonian 
lens, I think they are describing Learning II. I have to infer from Bateson’s writing that he 
is skeptical or at least cautious about thinking that someone can acquire Learning II 
beyond early childhood, though his talk about psychoanalysis suggests that maybe he 
thinks Learning II can be reached in the therapeutic setting, and the indications in his 
writing that he would not have been surprised by the discovery of neuroplasticity might 
have made him rethink the early childhood claim. The Spindlers are far more optimistic 
that the anthropology or similar classroom can do this therapeutic work. It is group work 
for them, of course. 
So what does the folklore classroom look like if one conceives of its interactions as 
something like group therapy? 
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The Spindlers relied heavily on projective tests or their equivalent in their own 
teaching. They used classic projective tests when working with individual informants in 
their anthropological fieldwork, but when it came to their own classrooms they adapted 
the methods for work with groups. For example, they often used visual materials—
photographs and film or video—as the “texts” to work through with students to get the 
students to uncover what the Spindlers call “submerged cultural knowledge” (Spindler 
1999:468-70). They turned their classroom into an ethnographic site, with the 
postmodern anthropological twist that they enlisted the students in the collective 
description and analysis of the culture of the classroom and of the cultural knowledge the 
students bring to the classroom. As in all therapy, the therapist/teacher/midwife cannot 
hold a “correct answer” the clients/students/mothers should arrive at. Although the 
therapeutic interview resembles the Socratic method of teaching by relying upon strings 
of questions, Socrates had a “correct” answer in mind, while pretending otherwise, and 
led his pupils to that answer. Therapy should not work that way. Also, as in all therapy, 
this takes time. The teacher must discard the notion of coverage and work toward 
providing in the short time and framed space of a college course a model experience of 
self-discovery through group work.  
Bateson provides a wonderful example from his own teaching in an article originally 
published in the CoEvolution Quarterly and later appearing as the “Introduction” to his 
book, Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity (1979). Bateson recounts his 1950s 
experience teaching (as he puts it) “psychiatric residents at a Veterans Administration 
mental hospital in Palo Alto and young beatniks in the California School of Fine Arts in 
San Francisco” (1979:6). In Bateson’s view, he was teaching the same set of ideas to both 
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groups. He challenged the psychiatric residents by asking them to define two concepts: 
sacrament and entropy. None could. He posed a different challenge to the art students. He 
arrived in class with a freshly cooked crab and asked how would you arrive at the 
conclusion that this is or was a living thing? I’ll not recount Bateson’s leading the 
students, though careful questioning, to realizations about what the students know about 
their everyday worlds. Bateson doesn’t frame this teaching as cultural therapy, but I think 
the Spindlers would. 
Turning to my own teaching, since I shared earlier a teaching failure perhaps I should 
relate a success or two. I never framed these for myself or for the students as moments of 
group therapy, but in retrospect I think they were.  
It’s an old American Studies teaching stunt to bring into the classroom (as Bateson 
did) an object and ask the students to figure out what it is, what are the cultural contexts 
in which it is used, and what are its meanings to the users.  I did this many times with 
many objects, but the most successful was when I brought in a very elaborate Valentine’s 
Day card, complete with a box to mail it in, and asked the students what the artifact tells 
us about contemporary American culture.  
Probably my most successful therapy-like activity in the folklore course was to begin 
each term with a class “folkways dinner,” where students were asked to show up with 
food item (enough for eight at their table) that was meaningful to them and to be prepared 
to tell a story about that food and why it has special meaning for them. At the event, I 
seated them randomly at tables set for eight and asked them to hold off eating until 
everyone has told his or her story. The serendipity of what showed up at any table was 
part of the discovery, and I also asked them to take some notes while listening to others’ 
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stories because the writing assignment coming out of the foodways event was to write a 
brief essay talking about the stories, what they had in common, how they differed, how 
they suggested uses of food as communication in small groups.  
As I said, I never framed the foodways event as cultural therapy, but I saw it work 
that way. Some of the stories were silly and funny. Some were quite poignant, as was the 
story by one young woman who brought doughnuts and explained that she and her father 
regularly would walk together to the neighborhood doughnut shop to bring home a treat 
for breakfast. Her father had died within the previous year, and the doughnuts captured 
her memories of those special times with her father. Many stories were about ethnic food 
traditions, including mashups as a family might create a syncretic dish or meal for 
Thanksgiving.  
I had success with two assignments I gave students in residential honors courses I 
taught to first-year students. I liked teaching them their first quarter at Davis, when they 
were fresh from high school, still teenagers. One year I taught them a material culture 
course and their first assignment was to bring to class an object they brought with them 
(barely a week earlier) from home, to show us the object, and to give a three-minute 
speech to the class (twenty-five students) about the meanings of that object to them. 
Again, I did not frame this as group therapy, but it sure felt like it as the stories ranged 
from silly to deeply touching. Another year I was teaching these high-achieving students 
a course on documentary photography, and their first assignment was to do a self-portrait, 
mount it with one of the picture frames I provided, and hang the class self-portraits on the 
wall of the student room we were using as our classroom in their residence hall. The 
assignment was to take a self-portrait that “told” the viewer something important to know 
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about them. They did incredible self-portraits and we spent hours listening to their stories 
and discussing the photographs.  
In the folklore course I taught with the graduate student we began the course with 
showing the “Bart Ruins Thanksgiving” episode of The Simpsons and led the students 
through a discussion of that family and its patterns of communication (its folklore, 
without using the word much).  We wanted to begin with something very familiar to the 
students (we also considered some Southpark episodes as a possible example) as a way of 
introducing them to folk traditions as a resource people use to deal with tensions and 
anxieties in the small group. We followed up that viewing and discussion with the 
foodways dinner and with our reading Cindy Dell Clark’s book. In retrospect, I realize 
that we two teachers knew that we were using the Simpsons episode as a projective test, 
that students would have to tap into and try to articulate their own “submerged cultural 
knowledge” about Thanksgiving traditions and family dynamics.  
The fact that a number of these students were unable to “get it” when they came to 
write a paper about the uses of a tradition in their own family does not mean that this 
chain of assignments—Simpsons, foodways dinner, discussions of the Clark book—
failed. But if we had the courage to frame the class as a form of group cultural therapy, 
then we might have devoted the full ten-week quarter to Thanksgiving. We lacked the 
nerve to do this, but it takes a radical move like that to get a majority of the students to be 
able to bring to consciousness what they really know.4 
                                                
4 It is important to realize that every signal the university classroom gives students is 
that “you don’t know anything and we’re here to teach you,” devaluing students’ tacit 
knowledge. In fact, by the time they arrive as first-year college students, they have had 
thirteen-plus years of schooling telling them they know nothing. 
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I have one more technique to discuss, one that I did not ever use but which I wish I 
had tried. As we have seen in the other examples, we can do in the classroom something 
like what a therapist does in “the talking cure” —namely, we can let the students talk in 
the natural attitude about some phenomenon familiar to them and then examine closely 
the words, metaphors, and images in that talk. Dreams have lots of cultural content, and a 
common therapeutic technique is to ask the client to relate a dream. John Caughey, a 
trained anthropologist who teaches American Studies at the University of Maryland, 
College Park, has found it very useful in his teaching to have students keep diaries of 
their daydreams (Caughey 1984). These daydreams then become the texts” to unpack as 
the students come to see the cultural content of their daydreams and to see how the 
daydreams mix the personal with the cultural.  
My intention with these few examples is to get the reader—someone who teaches 
folklore or related reflexive cultural studies—to think about the classroom as the setting 
for a particular sort of group therapy. This should be a collective conversation as folklore 
teachers experiment with and report on the cultural therapy in their classrooms.  
 
Some Real World Stakes 
I composed this essay many times in my head, over several years, before I finally 
committed these ideas to paper and electrons. My aim has been to answer for myself 
whether one can teach the cognitive style and skills necessary to think like a folklorist. In 
the end, I am still somewhat skeptical, but that doesn’t mean we should not stop trying. 
Collectively, folklorists should be able to share their “best practices” in teaching folklore, 
especially when their practices yield glimpses of the change in cognitive style I’m hoping 
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for. I want to close this essay—which never really is finished—with a comment on the 
higher stakes of being able to teach people how to move comfortably in and out of frames 
and how to respond creatively to the paradoxes of communication in everyday life.  
In the fall of 2010 I signed on to be the humanities consultant for a former student’s 
documentary video project on a residential treatment center for Iraq and Afghanistan war 
veterans who suffer from complex PTSD. At one of the planning meetings for the project, 
the therapist running the residential center, a Vietnam vet himself, said that in his 
experience those vets who went into the military already having the cognitive ability to 
be reflexive about their lives had a far better chance of some sort of recovery from the 
symptoms of complex PTSD than did those who did not have that ability. He thought the 
non-reflexive men had little chance at recovery. 
What this says to me is that figuring out ways to teach young adults how to have the 
reflexive, double consciousness we see as crucial to work in American Studies, folklore, 
anthropology, and related fields is more than an intellectual exercise. We are trying to 
define and create the learning moments for people to acquire and hone some very 
important life skills, some very important psychological survival skills, even life-saving 
and sanity-saving skills. Bateson, Heller, they both saw it. The choice is between 
creativity and madness.  
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